At the start of the meeting, the urgency of the discussion around Ukraine’s accession was underlined by Emmanuelle Mikosz, Director General of the Forum for the Future of Agriculture. In opening the session: “Time is short”, she said, both for the event and for the integration of Ukrainian agriculture. She thanked the joint organisers, the Ukrainian Agri Council and the German-Ukrainian Agriculture Policy Dialogue (APD), as well as the session’s host, MEP Paulo do Nascimento Cabral.

The vision for enlargement
Joining by video, Paulo do Nascimento Cabral opened with a message of solidarity praising Ukrainians’ “extraordinary courage, resilience and determination defending their country, their democracy and our shared European values”. The opening of accession negotiations was a historic step that now requires Europe to work out what Ukrainian integration means in practice for the Common Agricultural Policy.

He set out the scale of both the opportunity and the challenge, with an estimated 400 million people worldwide depending directly or indirectly on Ukrainian agricultural exports, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Against that, the war has left deep scars: rebuilding the sector will cost more than $56 billion, with demining alone adding a further $32 billion.

Concerns around competition, market integration and the future financing of the CAP are understandable, he said. He flagged a “structural mismatch” that runs through the accession debate: EU farms average around 11 hectares, against Ukrainian holdings averaging between 200 and 2000 hectares. Applying current CAP rules to Ukraine would cost 19.6 billion Euro in CAP payments over seven years, leading to an estimated 20% reduction in subsidies for existing member states, he said.

But the debate “cannot focus solely on the cost of enlargement”. With the EU still heavily dependent on imports of feed proteins, fertilisers and other inputs, Ukraine’s potential to ease those dependencies makes the case as much about EU food security and strategic autonomy as about Ukraine itself.

“If managed correctly, Ukraine’s accession will not weaken EU’s agriculture. It will strengthen it,” he concluded.

Lessons from Slovenia’s accession
Janez Potočnik, Chair ForumforAg and Chairman of the RISE Foundation, drew on his own experience from Slovenia’s accession negotiations. Two choices from that process had proved especially useful: keeping the negotiating team politically independent while building cross-party support, and publishing negotiating positions rather than keeping them confidential, creating ownership in advance rather than having to win support after the fact.

Agriculture and environment were among the most complex areas in Slovenia’s talks. “Ukraine faces a challenge of much greater magnitude,” he said. It was encouraging that Ukraine and the EU had opened the first negotiating cluster, on rule of law and fundamental rights.

Drawing parallels with the Balkans, Mr Potočnik argued that European integration can be one of the most powerful tools for reconciliation and stability. But he cautioned against treating agriculture and the environment as opposing interests: “There is no future for agriculture without healthy soils, biodiversity, water security… and there is certainly no future for agriculture without a stable climate.” Challenges are systemic and call for systemic change, he said.

“No country joins the European Union overnight, no country transforms its agricultural system overnight, and no country builds resilience alone,” he concluded. “That is why today’s discussion is so important. Together, we can identify pathways that balance economic opportunity with environmental responsibility… practical solutions that support Ukrainian farmers while advancing European sustainability objectives.”

Asked by Emmanuelle for one piece of advice, he urged optimism: “Optimists change the world… if you stay committed, consistent, you are on a good journey.”

Concrete progress and opportunities ahead
Joining online, Taras Vysotskyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine, offered a nuanced perspective on the scale of Ukrainian agriculture and the likely impacts of accession to the CAP. He disagreed with the commonly cited figure of Ukraine having 40 million hectares of agricultural land: a more accurate estimate would be 24.5 million hectares – a difference of roughly 50%. That smaller scale means there is no critical risk to future CAP cycles from integration, he said. On demining, while contamination on occupied territory cannot yet be assessed, monitoring on safe, controlled territory shows that no more than around 3% of land requires special decontamination measures, with most soil suitable for production.

Mr Vysotskyi highlighted concrete progress on the accession process: the basic legislative groundwork is due to be in place by the end of 2026. He echoed Janez Potočnik, stressing transparency must be a guiding principle, both with EU member states and domestically through dialogue with agricultural associations.

Asked by Emmanuelle about his hopes for the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Poland, held in June, he pointed to two goals: building stakeholder understanding of the real current state of Ukrainian agriculture, and demonstrating that the sector remains genuinely open for investment. “It’s profitable to invest in Ukrainian agriculture even during the hard times of the full-scale invasion,” he concluded.

“We need to reframe the conversation”
Ambassador Vsevolod Chentsov, Head of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU, turned to practical rather than purely political terms. Agriculture already accounts for roughly half of Ukraine’s external budget revenues, with half of that coming from the EU – underlining how integrated the two are already.

Some products flowing between Ukraine and Europe in both directions are already a combination of produce from Ukraine and other countries: from milk to seeds, to animal feed and technology. Efforts to limit Ukrainian market access, he warned, would also constrain the European industries that supply and process Ukrainian goods.

“We need to demystify Ukrainian agriculture to make sure that people understand its great value.” It is not only about big, integrated holdings but also small and medium-sized farms. The issue, he argued, is bigger than defending European farmers’ interests alone; it concerns food security and economic stability on both sides.

Twenty years of bilateral cooperation
Christoph Gilgen, of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Regional Identity of Germany, BMLEH, set out the institutional backbone behind the accession negotiations: the German-Ukrainian Agriculture Policy Dialogue, now in its seventh phase since launching 20 years ago, supports Ukrainian reform efforts and alignment with EU policy.

He highlighted April’s German-Ukrainian intergovernmental consultations, where President Zelensky and Chancellor Merz reaffirmed a strategic partnership, and announced a new multilateral working group and topic-specific task forces bringing together both ministries, the European Commission, parliamentary committees, business associations and researchers -with food safety, rural development, land management and environmental issues as initial priorities.

“Today, our cooperation is more effective, our trusting partnership is stronger, and our friendship and the bond between our societies are deeper than ever,” he said.

A farmer’s view: surviving first, joining later
Andrii Dykun, Chairman of the Ukrainian Agri Council, brought the discussion back to the realities facing farmers. The war’s “kill zone” along the front, he said, has expanded from a few kilometres to over 100, with more drones hitting Ukrainian fields as harvest gets under way; daily attacks on port infrastructure raise the risk of a repeat of the 2022 Black Sea blockade, with no guarantees or insurance currently available for port equipment and facilities.

Ukrainian farmers, he said, want to join the EU, in a way that is mutually beneficial for both for Ukrainian and for European farmers.

Session I: Mapping the impact (the agricultural lens)
“Shooting at a moving target”
The first session was moderated by Tassos Haniotis, Special Advisor for Sustainable Productivity at the Forum for the Future of Agriculture and Senior Guest Research Scholar at IIASA. With CAP reform, EU budget negotiations and Ukraine’s accession process all running in parallel, he said, “it’s like you’re shooting at a moving target”. Overlaid on this is a major geostrategic rebalancing with an unpredictable outcome. Despite that, four researchers took the floor in turn to map the likely impacts of Ukraine’s integration.

From mines to markets
A series of bottlenecks will need to be addressed, said Dr. Tinatin Akhvlediani, Head of the Enlargement Programme and Research Fellow in the EU Foreign Policy Unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). She drew on the findings of a CEPS task force on Ukraine’s agricultural recovery to highlight demining and land safety; access to finance, particularly for the millions of small and medium-sized enterprises that form the backbone of Ukrainian farming; the digital divide, with some farms still running Russian-origin software that poses data sovereignty risks as Ukraine aligns with EU frameworks; and finally infrastructure, where war damage amounts to some 200 billion Euro and functioning logistics corridors are a precondition for trade.

“Rebuilding infrastructure is not just recovering trade with the EU but, most importantly, recovering trade globally.” It was essential to reach consumers where Ukrainian goods are desperately needed, and to avoid concentrating them in the bordering EU countries.

Dr Akhvlediani spoke of complementarity rather than competition. Ukrainian farmers specialise in bulk, lower-value segments where Europe already depends on less reliable partners. “Ukraine offers a good source for strengthening the resilience of the EU in the products where it’s already importing.”

A strategic powerhouse
Prof. Dr. Alfons Balmann, Director and Head of the Department of Structural Change at IAMO, presented a joint study by IAMO, the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development Transition Economies, and the Kiev School of Economics, highlighted benefits and risks.

He reinforced the complementarity case with a striking headline figure: together, the EU and Ukraine are a “powerhouse”, already accounting for 30% of global food exports. That combined weight should be deployed strategically, he said.

A further opportunity lies in Ukraine’s processing gap – currently only around 20% of Ukrainian agricultural production is processed domestically, against roughly 60% in the EU or Brazil – creating significant scope for investment that would deepen integration and add value on both sides.

Dr Balmann turned to often-cited tensions between EU environmental ambitions and Ukrainian production priorities. This area is also a vast opportunity: “There is a huge potential on both sides to increase production and to increase environmental goods. But that requires structural change which requires fundamental debate.”

Reading the competitiveness outlook
How would integration affect Ukrainian agricultural competitiveness? Dr. Oleh Nivievskyi, Professor at the Kyiv School of Economics, offered a framework for assessment across three variables: productivity, output prices, and input prices.

On inputs, average tariff levels between Ukraine and the EU are close enough that the shift to a common customs arrangement is unlikely to produce a sharp negative shock. On outputs, compliance with EU standards could lift Ukrainian produce into a higher quality tier, improving market access. On compliance costs, available evidence points to a figure of around 10% on average – significant but manageable, particularly given productivity improvements that integration could unlock.

“From the big picture, I see Ukrainian competitiveness quite optimistically when it comes to EU integration,” he said.

One country, many integration pathways
Dr. Taras Gagalyuk, Senior Researcher at IAMO, rounded out the panel with a structural analysis of Ukrainian agriculture’s diversity and regional specialisations. He analysed three distinct farm groups – micro and small farms, medium enterprises, and large holdings. These, he said, are complementary rather than interchangeable, each serving different markets and facing different integration challenges.

The war has sharpened regional differentiation further: production has shifted westward, and the top ten regions now generate 64% of total agricultural output, up from 57% before the invasion. Highly specialised, export-oriented regions in the east face the greatest CAP adaptation pressure; more diversified regions in the west are already closer to EU standards.

“Each of these regions will face EU integration challenges and opportunities differently,” he said. While all regions have to converge in a single EU integration model, pathways need to be differentiated by region and farm type. “Policymakers need to take that into account and avoid one size fits all approaches,” he concluded.

Session II: Aligning standards (the environmental lens)
Ongoing dynamics, open choices
The session was moderated by Olga Trofimtseva, Ukrainian politician, business leader, and expert in agricultural and food systems, agricultural policy, Agtech, and sustainable agriculture. She handed the floor first to Dr. Elsa Régnier, Research Fellow, Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), who had two key messages. The first: Ukraine’s accession does not create new agricultural challenges for the EU: it accelerates dynamics already under way. Trade and standards alignment have been increasing steadily since the mid-2000s and the 2017 implementation of the free trade agreement. The second: nothing is determined in advance. “It’s all a matter of political choices and negotiation,” she said.

On the challenging side, she pointed to the production cost gap. Maize costs around €97 per tonne to produce in Ukraine against €200-240 per tonne in France, a gap that a 10% compliance cost levy does not close. How to make these different models coexist in the same market? That was a key political question that will need answering whether accession happens or not.

On the positive side, she pointed to the opportunity for EU protein self-sufficiency. Europe imports around 30 million tonnes of soybean annually predominantly for animal feed. Ukraine produced 4 million tonnes of soy in 2023 and could reach 5.5 million tonnes by 2030, against total European production of just 3 million tonnes. Ukraine alone will not close the gap, she said, but it substantially strengthens the EU’s position on a critical vulnerability.

“The clock is ticking”
The urgent need to move forward on environmental standards was highlighted by Peter Polajnar, Deputy Head of Unit for Economic and Sectoral Policies, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG NEAR. Ukraine’s agricultural market access is conditional on meeting specific environmental standards by the end of 2028, he said. If those standards are not met, the Commission reserves the right to reduce Ukraine’s agricultural quotas – an outcome that would be “very dangerous”.

Two directives are in focus. The first is the Nitrates Directive, which protects European waters from agricultural pollution and requires national action plans agreed between government and farmers. Ukraine has made no legislative progress in this area. The second is the Industrial Emissions Directive as amended in 2024, which extends pollution controls to large livestock farms. Ukraine is partially aligned with the pre-2024 version but has not yet moved to incorporate the 2024 amendments, which set stricter thresholds for nitrogen, ammonia and methane from pig and poultry operations.

This was not just about compliance, said Mr Polajnar: meeting these standards has the potential to modernise Ukrainian farms, improve animal welfare, reduce a productivity gap of around 20% below EU levels, and strengthen Ukraine’s competitiveness on global markets beyond the EU.

“We’re very much committed to helping Ukraine and to investing,” he said, but the available resources had not been fully used. “The clock is ticking towards the end of 2028, and these are complex reforms with potentially heavy investment on the private sector side.”

Taking stock of environmental damage
The impact of the war on Ukraine’s environment was the subject of the next talk, from Claudio Belis, Project Leader and Senior Scientist, Clean Air and Climate Unit, JRC Directorate C Energy, Transport and Climate, joining online. He presented findings from a JRC report, drawing on data from the period covering the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of military operations.

Soil erosion is the most widespread threat, he said, affecting 40% of Ukrainian territory. Nutrient mismanagement is causing significant nitrogen losses that leach into water systems, threatening long-term soil fertility and crop yields. Military operations have introduced toxic elements including lead, mercury and arsenic into the soil, with potential to enter food chains.

Air quality in some regions exceeded WHO thresholds for particulate matter. Greenhouse gas emissions fell sharply with the onset of military operations, but the destruction of industrial and energy facilities has created new pollution sources. Forest fires reached record levels in 2024, with implications for agricultural land. The Black Sea is facing elevated pesticide concentrations and microplastic contamination.

However, the Ukraine plan is a pivotal instrument for integrating environmental objectives into recovery and reconstruction. He finished: “We have seen progress in Ukraine since the 2010s, and this has led to some positive result in meeting some environmental standards.”

Survival first, then standards
Andriy Dykun, Chairman of the Ukrainian Agri Council, brought the day’s discussions back to ground level. He welcomed the quality of the expert debate: “For the first time since two years coming to Brussels, I hear real discussion of experts”. But what is still missing, he said, is a shared vision: “a common cathedral thinking for Ukrainian and EU joint agriculture in future.” What will the standards Ukrainian farmers are being asked to meet actually look like under a new CAP? The target – he agreed with Tassos Haniotis’s opening remark – is still moving.

The immediate concerns were farmers operating in affected areas risking their lives daily, and those killed have no government support for families equivalent to that provided to fallen soldiers. Port infrastructure remains under sustained attack. “Priority number one is to survive,” he said.

Mr Dykun saw opportunity in the processing potential identified by earlier speakers. The main challenge is how to compete in the global south against Russian grain being deliberately weaponised as a geopolitical tool. Standards compliance, while necessary, does not on its own answer that question.

Finding a compromise
Oleksii Pinchuk, representing the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, rounded off the sessions by confirming Ukraine is committed to meeting its 2028 obligations. He ended by looking forward: “We need to identify the concerns of European farmers about Ukraine entering the EU and take steps from both sides to find a compromise where every farmer will be comfortable.”